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Evidence suggestive of the 'fuzzy' structure of many natural language (as opposed to 
scientific) categories is reviewed. Examples are drawn from categorization schemes for objects, 
such as cars, fruit or tables, as well as for people, such as extroverts, hippies and 'fraternity 
types'. It is argued that despite the fuzziness of natural categories, there is orderliness and 
utility to these concepts, as well. Specifically, natural categories are organized around pro- 
totypes, representative category members, which serve as reference points for the category. The 
identification of category members involves a prototype-matching process. Prototypes about 
'kinds of people' can be very useful in decisions about people with whom to affiliate and places 
in which to live. This process was illustrated by reference to a case analysis of students' 
preferences for university housing. It was concluded that natural categories may well be fuzzy, 
but they are far from being dispensible. 
Keywords: Natural categories, Prototypes, Self-monitor, Distinctiveness, Interpersonal goals, 
Self-to-prototype matching heuristic. 
1. Natural categories for people and objects 
It  would  be t i resome to correct  ourselves each t ime that  we offhandedly  
refer red  to m u s h r o o m s  and  tomatoes  as ingredients  in a 'vegetable  salad' .  If we 
have invi ted  our  f r iend the botanis t  to d inner ,  however ,  we can scarcely avoid a 
conf ron ta t ion  on  this issue. Predic tably ,  the bo tan is t  has tens  to in form us that  the 
salad, given these ingredients ,  is a f ru i t - fungus-vege tab le  salad, and  that  if we 
chose to add watercress  the n a m e  would  sound  even  less appetizing.  Meanwhi le ,  
the o ther  d i n n e r  guests roll their  eyes with impat ience ,  th inking:  " A r e  tomatoes  
sweet?  No! Do  I pou r  I ta l ian salad dressing on  b a n a n a s ?  No! For  all practical 
purposes  mush rooms  and  tomatoes  are, qui te  obviously,  v e g e t a b l e s . . .  I th ink . "  
The  proverb ia l  ' e r ror ' ,  that  of classifying tomatoes  and  mush r ooms  as vegeta-  
bles, and  the unce r t a in ty  exper ienced  in the process of classification i l lustrate 
some differences in the genesis, s t ructure  and  funct ion  of formal  scientific 
categories on  the one  h a n d  and  na tura l  categories,  the me a ns  by which individuals  
informal ly  organize  their  perceptua l  and  conceptua l  env i ronmen t s ,  on  the other.  
Tha t  is, bo tanis t s  have inven ted  a qui te  order ly  and  comprehens ive  t a x o n o m y  
based on  defining morphologica l  and /o r  genet ic  a t t r ibutes  in order  to organize  
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their subject matter and to guide the field as a whole. But, day to day, 
non-experts often find themselves unable to follow the rules of tightly-structured 
taxonomies. Instead, they form 'fuzzy' natural categories calling, for example, 
'things that go in salads' members of the vegetable category [19, 33]. Natural 
categories blur the distinctions between classes of objects, breaking down the neat 
structure of those scientific taxonomic classifications. When non-experts classify 
fruits and vegetables, and other objects for which experts can find distinguishing 
defining features, those non-experts tend to partition the objects not on the basis 
of the select, criterial features, but rather on the basis of a larger array of 
characteristic features. As a result, the boundaries between categories are by no 
means c l ea r - I s  a tomato really more like a fruit (apple, pear) than a vegetable 
(spinach, peas)? 
The fuzzy structure of natural categories, and the flexibility with which they are 
utilized by non-experts, becomes even more apparent in the study of classification 
systems based on attributes of people: for example, taxonomies of personality 
traits, mental illness, intelligence. In those domains, even the 'experts' have had 
considerable difficulty carving up the stimuli into well-defined taxonomies (see, 
for example, [11, 17] on psychiatric diagnostic taxonomies; [54]; [8] on the 
classification of personality traits; [37] on the concept of intelligence). This 
fuzziness persists in the classification of people even when one might assume the 
existence of some criterial features: Consider distinctions between men and 
women, masculinity and femininity [5, 35]. If the scientists cannot always distin- 
guish apples from oranges in the social environment, it is hardly surprising that 
the casual observer repeatedly perceives and employs imperfectly structured 
person, situation and object categories. 
The importance of the conceptualization of natural categories, social categories 
in particular, as fuzzy sets is its prescription for studying how the social observer 
responds to the environment. Predictions about people's behavioral uniformity 
and variability are more sensitive if the cognitive 'rules' by which individuals 
assess social stimuli and regulate their actions accordingly are explored. 
The theme of the present review, however, is that the fuzziness of natural 
categories does not imply their messiness or uselessness. In support of this point, 
we will draw on research literature concerned with the structure, mental represen- 
tation and function of natural categories in a wide variety of domains involving 
animate and inanimate 'objects'. Our examples will range from categories for 
birds, fruit and cars to those used to sort extroverts, hippies and fraternity types. 
We will begin with a discussion of the 'fuzzy' but, nonetheless, orderly structure of 
natural categories and then turn to various models for the mental representation 
of knowledge about categories. Finally, in order to document our message about 
the utility of natural categories, we will present a case study analysis of an 
everyday decision-making task-choos ing  university hous ing- in  which fuzzy 
natural categories are implicated in the observed choice preferences. 
2. The structure of natural categories 
Following Wittgenstein [55], linguists, philosophers and psychologists alike 
have recognized that natural concepts do not partition objects, animate or 
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inanimate, into nicely-bounded categories (cf. [44]). This line of thought repre- 
sents a departure from the traditional, classical view of categorization. The 
classical approach maintains that all members of a category share a single, 
complete set of defining features. Such a principle implies that the clearly-defined 
categories addressed by this view share at least four properties. First, category 
membership is based strictly on an all-or-none criterion; that is, possession of a 
set of singly necessary, jointly sufficient characteristics. Second, since all members 
share a set of common features, all members are equally suitable representatives 
of the concept. Third, categories are disjunctive; at one level of inclusiveness in a 
taxonomy, no single object can enjoy membership in more than one category 
simultaneously. Finally, since all defining features are necessary, each is equally 
salient in determining class membership. 
The properties assumed to be true of categories and taxonomies, according to 
the classical view, are in fact characteristic of very few sets of stimuli in the 
environment that are naturally and quite consensually clustered together. It 
follows, then, that the classical view is altogether incompatible with the study of 
social concepts. As it happens, the state of the social world is not one of clearly 
partitionable stimuli; and so the imprecisions that are inherent in the environment 
get reproduced in the organization of objects into natural categories and tax- 
onomies (see [15]). 
2.1. Fuzziness 
It is clear from the work of Rosch and her colleagues (see [43]) that people 
usually agree about the nesting of natural object categories into hierarchies. These 
taxonomic structures typically possess at least three levels of inclusiveness or 
abstraction. A representative object taxonomy may include categories which vary 
in abstractness, such as these: v e h i c l e - a u t o m o b i l e - s p o r t s  car. Despite their 
relatively organized and consensual structure, however, natural taxonomies suffer 
from a property described as imperfect feature nesting. Frequently, an attribute 
considered highly associated with membership in a given category, such as the 
feature 'flies' with the concept 'bird', is not true of a member  of a more specific 
sub-category, such as the category 'chicken' in this example [46]. 
The ill-defined quality of natural t axonomies -a s  seen in the natural category 
hierarchies - is also illustrated in the horizontal structure of natural categories; the 
manner  in which objects are classified at any given level of abstraction [43]. 
Natural categories seem to be 'fuzzy sets'; category membership is not determined 
by the possession of a set of necessary and sufficient defining features. If a tomato 
is a fruit, why isn't it sweet as most fruits are? Is sweetness a defining feature of 
the category fruit? Probably not. We run in circles if we try to state absolutes 
about natural categories. Instead, stimuli seem to be grouped together to form a 
general category because they share many features that are perceived to be highly 
correlated with membership. So, just as tomatoes do not possess the quality 
'sweet', all 'fruit' are not required to share the entire set of characteristics which 
are typical of that category [48]. Moreover,  all characteristics are not equally 
common in the category. The property 'sweet' is more central to the concept fruit, 
for example, than is another  attribute, such as round. It is the case, therefore, that 
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any one category may possess both highly representative and unclear or border-  
line category members ;  members  vary along a continuum of perceived goodness 
of fit or prototypicality in a category [33, 45]. 
Since natural categories are not defined by a set of necessary and sufficient 
features, the boundaries between perceptually or conceptually similar concepts 
are not always well-specified. Consider how often our inability to comprehen-  
sively cluster stimuli into orthogonal groups is reflected in the language we use in 
reference to dubious or borderline cases: objects are ' reddish' ;  literature is 
'Kafkaesque ' ;  foods are 'sweet-sour ' .  The implication is that closely related 
categories frequently overlap as the continuum of features that facilitate specifica- 
tion of membersh ip  in one category fades into that of another  category. There  is 
thus no absolute demarcat ion between fruits and vegetables; the features of one 
concept are shared extensively with the other. 
The conceptualization of natural categories as fuzzy sets nested in loosely 
structured taxonomies is perhaps even more  suitable when applied to the study of 
social categories. One  predominate  categorization scheme by which individuals 
naturally cluster 'kinds of people '  is based on personality characteristics which are 
inferred in the process of observing and attributing causes to social behavior  [26, 
47]. Cantor  and Mischel [15], for example,  worked with four abstract person 
categories (Extroverts, Cultured People, People  Commit ted  to a Cause, and 
Emotionally Unstable People). These categories were chosen because they fre- 
quently emerge as basic factors in studies of personality traits [38]. Cantor  and 
Mischel [15] used these abstract categories in order to generate four person 
taxonomies: they asked students to cluster each of 32 more  specific person 
categories under one of these four abstract categories. For example,  the superor-  
dinate category cultured persons was consistently used to incorporate the two 
less-inclusive categories, man-of-the-world sophisticate and patron of the arts. 
These middle-level categories were then further divided into more  specific sub- 
categories (e.g., man-of- the-world  was divided into gourmet and world traveler). 
However ,  when asked to describe the features common to members  of each 
category, subjects listed features as true of man-of- the-world,  which were not 
necessarily seen as true of the gourmet,  for example;  so the imperfect feature 
nesting proper ty  is clearly characteristic of person hierarchies. Furthermore,  f rom 
the point of view of a classical theorist there are two additional 'p roblems '  with 
person taxonomies.  
First of all, within a person taxonomy (e.g., People Commit ted  to a Cause) any 
particular subcategory, such as fighter against child abuse, may seem to fit well 
within more  than one higher order category (religious devotee or social activist). 
And secondly, a me m ber  of a given category may be an equally representat ive 
m e m b e r  of another,  related category at the same level of abstraction. The fighter 
against child abuse may also be a save-the-whales demonstrator. Neither  cir- 
cumstance is tolerated by the classical view of categorization which asserts that 
concepts in a taxonomy should be disjointed, with no overlapping elements. In the 
person domain, however,  it would not be difficult to think of an individual who is 
both a religious devotee and a social activist; both a patron of the arts and a man 
of the world sophisticate. 
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One should not be fooled into thinking that these are just poorly constructed 
taxonomies, for the overlap between person categories within a given taxonomy is 
true even when one considers more carefully derived 'scientific' person tax- 
onomies, rather than the 'everyday variety' used by Cantor  and Mischel [15]. For 
example, Cantor  et al. [17] worked with psychiatric diagnostic categories and 
observed the same imprecisions: imperfect feature nesting, non-rigid category 
boundaries, characteristic rather than criterial category features, and a continuum 
of category membership from clear to 'borderline'  cases. 
Since person categories are fuzzy and overlapping, category membership is a 
matter  of degree, but fortunately the social environment is replete with helpful 
indicators. Consider the process of identifying an extroverted person. Most 
extroverts, people tend to agree, are friendly and gregarious. Still, some are more 
accurately described as aggressive and energetic, and no t  particularly warm or 
sociable. As a concept, extrovert contains both 'classic' as well as atypical, 
dubious examples. Moreover,  complicating matters further is the information 
made available to the perceiver by the ongoing behavior of a target individual. 
Since behavior, which implies the existence of particular personality characteris- 
tics, varies as a function of context, class membership depends in part upon the 
frequency, or proportion of extroverted behaviors across time and in different 
social situations. We are all aware that extroverts can act in an introverted fashion 
within a formal, stressful or unfamiliar context. In fact, a display of extroverted 
conduct (talking, laughing and socializing) in the context of a funeral, for example, 
may be inappropriate enough to warrant a shift in the classification of an 
individual from "ext rover t"  to 'emotionally unstable person' .  Ascertaining cate- 
gory membership for person categories requires a probabilistic assessment; one 
that may shift with increasing exposure to the target individual. 
2.2. O r d e r l i n e s s  
At this point, the reader  may wonder how psychologists can consider natural 
categories to be orderly and useful. There  do not seem to be criterial features for 
natural categories; similar categories overlap considerably in characteristic fea- 
tures and, thus, in membership. But, we would argue, if natural classification 
systems are not flawless in their structure, neither are they haphazard or messy. 
Theories of the cognitive representation of natural categories provide a 
framework within which to understand the orderliness of natural categories as 
they are used by the average perceiver of the physical and social environment.  
The study of categorical representation has been fruitfully guided by the assump- 
tion that it is the most prototypical or central element of a concept that is held in 
long-term memory [43]. So, even while natural categories are not precisely 
circumscribed and have t remendous heterogeneity of membership, they can be 
simplified by "thinking of prototypes."  Prototypes are defined not as the most fre- 
quent  per se but the most representative members of a class; the elements that best 
symbolize the essential meaning of the category. The significance of prototypical- 
ity has been demonstrated in studies of perceptual learning [39, 41], inductive 
reasoning [27], and semantic memory [49]. Moreover,  support for the argument 
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that natural categories are stored in memory  as prototypes derives f rom the 
literature on the organization, speed and accuracy of classifying objects that vary 
along a continuum of representativeness as members  of a certain category [49]. In 
addressing the first issue, Mervis, Catlin and Rosch [34] found that highly 
representat ive members  of a category are most  likely to come to mind first when 
subjects are asked to list as many instances of a concept as possible within a t ime 
constraint. For example,  when required to generate members  of the category 
furniture, individuals will list chair and sofa long before they list hatrack and 
reading lamp. In addition, subjects are quicker to classify a prototypical  target 
example of a category than an atypical example [42, 43]. That  is, robin and 
sparrow are identified as members  of the category bird more  rapidly than are 
eagle or hawk, which are, in turn, classified more  rapidly than are goose or 
chicken. Finally, 'errors '  or disagreements in classification per  se also decrease as 
representativeness of the target example increases. 
As the central tendency or focal point of a concept, a prototype can serve as a 
reference point; a standard of comparison to which stimuli can be compared  to 
facilitate judgment  of goodness of fit in a plausible category. The implication here 
is that while there are no easy and diagnostic rules to insure proper  categorization 
for fuzzy categories, target instances can be classified on the basis of similarity to a 
prototype [53]. For instance, an object  may be judged as a typical or representa-  
tive class m e m b e r  because it possesses many characteristics considered to be 
highly correlated with category membership  [45]. So, an apple is perceived as a 
good representative of the category, fruit, because it shares many  of the charac- 
teristics with one 's  prototype of fruit (e.g., is sweet, round, juicy, has seeds, can be 
peeled, grows individually, makes  good pies, and so on). To  the extent that an 
object  deviates from the prototype it is considered atypical, though still a member  
of the category. Some grapes don' t  have seeds, they grow in bunches and the peel 
is imperceptible;  thus, grapes are not particularly good representatives of the 
concept, fruit. Tomatoes ,  however,  are even poorer  examples,  since they are not 
sweet, and are found more  often in the company of vegetables than in pies. In 
other  words, on the basis of similarity-matching to prototypes,  target instances 
can be reliably categorized, even in fuzzy categories [48]. This rule makes  the 
categorization process more  orderly and consensual, and helps us to address the 
heterogeneity of category m e m b e r s - i n s t a n c e s  are judged to be more  or less 
prototypical based on possession of features which, themselves, are only corre- 
lated with membership  in the category. 
In the social domain, types of people  can also be reliably judged to vary along a 
continuum of goodness of fit in a category, by comparing a single instance to the 
standard or prototype (see [9] for prototypicality judgments  about  extroverts and 
intelligent persons; [20] for a discussion of occupational prototypes;  [6] for 
prototypes of the 'elderly ' ;  [29] on presidential candidate prototypes).  If one 
imagines a series of concentric circles representing goodness of fit, or distance to 
the central prototypes,  then, in our extrovert  example the aggressive, energetic 
extrovert  would lie in the periphery while the friendly, gregarious extrovert  would 
be more  centrally located. Given a standard or prototype represented in memory ,  
person and object categories no longer seem so messy; despite the variability of 
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members within categories, individuals can not only identify but also evaluate the 
representativeness of a particular example of a concept. 
Similarity-matching to prototypes relieves some of the problems of classification 
caused by the absence of criterial features in fuzzy natural categories. But, 
identifying what a target instance is requires that we also ascertain what it is not. 
This process of differentiation is made difficult in natural classification systems by 
the overlap of categories within a single taxonomy. However,  once again prob- 
abilistic rules of judgment can be reliable and orderly, though not infallible. For 
example, Rosch & Mervis [45] found that subjects used contrast sets of similar, 
overlapping categories in the prototype-matching p r o c e s s - a  tomato is an 
equivocal, borderline exemplar of the category fruit, not only because it has few 
of the prototypical features of fruit (it isn't sweet, cannot be peeled, isn't found in 
pies), but also because it shares as many features common to the contrast category 
of vegetable (it goes in salad, is tart, can be stewed). 
Similarly, in the person domain, Cantor  [9] found that subjects used the 
contrast category introvert quite effectively in distinguishing 'good' from 'poor '  
examples of the category extrovert.  The aggressive extrovert,  for example, may be 
a peripheral member  of the category, extrovert,  because 'coldness' is more typical 
of introverts than of extroverts. Even though extroverts and introverts are actually 
quite overlapping person categories, prototype-matching to prototypes for both 
categories can help an individual make a probabilistic estimate of 'best fit' for a 
target instance who seems to share features characteristic of both categories. 
Another  trick that individuals use to assess category fit in fuzzy person categories, 
is to consider the context in which an individual exhibits category-relevant 
behavior [9]. Back in the context of a funeral, our extrovert  may be quite easily 
differentiated from an emotionally-unstable person precisely because he exhibits 
an introvert 's r e s t r a i n t - t h e  use of situational cues can be very instrumental in 
resolving conflicts in person categorization. 
Person categorization is especially difficult not only because the categories 
within a single taxonomy overlap so much, but because it is quite reasonable to 
expect an individual to 'belong' to many of these interrelated categories at once. 
With regard to this aspect of the fuzziness of person taxonomies, Cantor [9] found 
that individuals seemed to relieve some of the ambiguity in categorization (when 
forced to make a single categorization for a target) by assessing the relative 
salience of the category-relevant features in the target person's total personality. 
A 'good' extrovert,  then, not only has many typical extroverted features (and few 
introverted qualities), but these extroverted features are also quite robust, being 
manifest in many situations, over time, and in a variety of behavioral forms. 
In order  to use contrast sets effectively in the similarity matching process, it is 
useful to know that categories close together in a taxonomy (i.e., in one branch of 
a multiple-branching taxonomy) are the ones likely to share similar prototypes 
and, thus, overlap in category membership. The absence of perfect feature nesting 
in natural taxonomies is a bit worrisome in that regard. Perfect feature nesting 
would certainly ensure the appropriateness of choosing contrast sets from a single 
branch of a taxonomy. In the context of imperfect feature nesting, such an 
algorithm for choice of contrast set could be a mistake. Cantor et al. [17] 
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observed such a problem in their study of psychiatric d iagnosis-pat ients  diag- 
nosed as manic-depressive-manics actually overlapped in clinical features most 
closely with a diagnostic category from another branch of the DSM-II  taxonomy 
(paranoid schizophrenic). However,  on the whole, that pattern of inter-category 
overlap is not observed. Instead, typically, the closer any two categories are to 
each other in a taxonomy (either vertically or horizontally close), the more their 
prototypes will tend to overlap in characteristic features (e.g., [16]). As a 
consequence, it is usually reasonable to assess degree of category fit by comparing 
an instance to the prototypes for multiple categories, all chosen from within a 
single region of a taxonomy. Again, natural categories and taxonomies are fuzzy, 
not messy; likewise, the rules of categorization are probabilistic, not unreliable. 
3. The representation of natural categories 
By now it should be clear that despite the fuzzy structure of many natural 
categories, prototypes seem to be highly memorable reference points or standards 
of comparison against which 'objects'  in the environment can be compared in 
order  to facilitate classification [43]. And, if prototypes provide order in natural 
categorization, then it is reasonable to assume that natural categories are rep- 
resented in long-term memory by prototypes. Consequently, the form that 
prototypes may take in long-term memory is a point of great interest [48]. 
According to one approach, the prototype is represented as one or more 
'classic' examples of old or known concept members [48]. An object is perceived 
as a good instance of a particular category if it represents a close match to at least 
one prototypical exemplar. To illustrate, Bob might promptly label a casual 
acquaintance, Mary, an ' introvert '  because she displays behaviors and characteris- 
tics that are consonant with those of an old friend, Frank, who represents a classic 
introvert. In this case, Frank possesses most features that Bob believes are highly 
associated with the introverted personality. Moreover,  Frank is a concrete, highly 
imageable standard of comparison. Since Mary is perceived to act like Frank in 
his essential, introverted ways, Mary is classified as an introvert - an introvert 'just 
like Frank'.  Bob, it should be noted, may also be familiar with two other 'classic' 
introverts, Rudy and Paul, who symbolize different introverted 'types'. For 
example, Rudy might be an anti-social, misanthropic and cold introvert, while 
Paul is a submissive, dependent  and unaggressive introvert. In this case, all three 
friends represent "typical introverted types" for Bob. To the extent that people 
encountered in his world match one of the three standards, Bob would classify 
them as introverts. But, what about atypical cases -  how does the exemplar- 
prototype help in classifying them? Following this approach, the atypical case 
would provide a poor  match to any one of the category exemplars - so, Joe, Bob's 
' introvert '  friend who is prone to displays of sudden extroversion, wouldn't  match 
very well to Frank, Rudy, or Paul. And, Joe's occasional extroversion might lead 
Bob to retrieve from memory some exemplars of the extrovert category, as well. 
The atypicality here would be symbolized by the poor  and conflicting matches to 
exemplars from the two contrast categories. The decisive criterion for labelling 
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Joe as 'basically' an introvert (with some extroverted tendencies) would center on 
order  of retrieval of category exempla r s -  Joe's features call to mind introvert ex- 
emplars before extrovert  exemplars [48]. 
The exemplar-prototype representation preserves separately in memory a vari- 
ety of concrete instances of the category; the representation nicely illustrates the 
heterogeneity of category membership. Another  well-researched prototype rep- 
resentation, the summary-prototype,  captures the potential for heterogeneity of 
members without directly storing in memory the different instances themselves 
[14, 46]. This view holds that a concept is represented as an abstract summary 
representation or theoretical ideal that consolidates all of those characteristics 
believed to be correlated with membership in the category. The most representa- 
tive members of a category, then, share many common features with the concept 
prototype and few overlapping characteristics with prototypes from other con- 
trasting categories. Of course, in reality, the entire set of attributes included in the 
prototype representation is found in few, if any members of the category; and 
even representative category members may possess different subsets of the 
features in the summary prototype (thus forming a family resemblance structure 
[55]). The  features in the summary prototype also vary in how representative of 
category members they are; that is, some features are common to most members 
(e.g., has feathers, has wings for the category, birds), while other  features are 
typical of only a few category members (e.g., nests in trees, migrates in winter). In 
this sense summary prototypes accommodate to the fuzziness of natural categories 
by allowing for a continuum of 'representativeness'  or prototypicality of member  
instances. 
The summary prototype representation has been quite well-researched in a 
number of domains; prototypes have been generated for categories ranging in 
content from tables and cars [46] to religious devotees and comic-jokers [15] 
to librarians and waitresses [20] to senior citizens, elder statesmen and 
'grandmotherly types' [6] to parties and religious ceremonies [16]. Typically, the 
prototype for a category is generated by asking a group of individuals to list the 
features common to and characteristic of category members. Each feature gener- 
ated for a category, then, has a frequency score representing the number of 
individuals in the group who thought of that feature for that c a t e g o r y - t h e  
frequency numbers are taken as indications of the degree of association of the 
feature with the category members. A consensual summary prototype can be 
formed by eliminating from the feature list for the category, idiosyncratic features 
that were listed by very few individuals (e.g., features listed by less than 10 or 
20% of the group). Of course, individuals differ in their prototypes for particular 
categories; there is usually good, but not by any means total agreement in these 
feature lists. There  are few, if any, criterial features which would come to mind 
immediately to all participants when describing most natural categories. 
To illustrate, consider the prototype of the concept, tree. People spontaneously 
describe trees as having green leaves, brownish bark, a trunk, and ascending 
branches. After  further consideration they will mention seasonal coloring and loss 
of leaves, or fruit in various forms. Some people may also refer to the "fact"  that 
trees provide shade, can be climbed and offer shelter for animals and birds. And 
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occasionally included in the ideal abstract summary is an indication of the 
standard size and shape (circular-shaped crown on a single trunk) of trees. 
Apparently,  immediately available in memory are those features of the prototype 
(e.g., green leaves, brownish bark and trunk) that are most fundamental to the 
concept of tree, or true of most members of the category. The characteristics 
'display seasonal coloring and loss of leaves' or 'can be climbed' are less central, 
and less often cited as essential features. Since to the non-botanist trees do not all 
share a small set of criterial features, even typical trees may not possess all of the 
characteristics that are part of the ideal summary. Note that trees that do closely 
match the category prototype,  such as elms, oaks and maples, also share many 
features in common with each other and do not overlap extensively with related 
categories (e.g., shrubs). On the other hand, cyprus, willows and palm trees are 
considered less representative; they possess fewer prototypic features and share 
much in common with other  categories (plants). 
The exemplar-prototype and the summary-prototype both seem to provide 
orderly and useful representations of the fuzziness of many natural categories. [In 
fact, as Armstrong, Gleitman and Gleitman [2] have argued, even well-defined 
natural categories have a continuum of prototypicality of membership based on 
possession of characteristic features in addition to criterial ones. Consequently, 
these prototype representations would be useful-even in the identification of 
members of well-defined categories.] Which representation, then, is superior? The 
representation should provide a vivid, rich, and yet flexible portrait of category 
members, while simultaneously differentiating the category from other neighbor- 
ing categories. Such a representation would be ideally suited for use as a standard 
of comparison in the identification of category members. 
In considering the utility of each prototype representation, it is important to 
recall that people categorize objects and other people at many levels of abstrac- 
tion or inclusiveness, depending upon their goals and purposes at the time. 
Perhaps the summary prototype and the exemplar prototype are useful as 
representations of categories at different levels of inclusiveness in taxonomies 
[12]. The work of Rosch and her colleagues on 'basic level' categories provides 
some support for this speculation. Rosch et al. [46], working with three level 
taxonomies, found especially vivid (imageable), rich and distinctive (nonoverlap- 
ping) summary prototypes for categories of common objects described at a middle 
level of inclusiveness. The summary prototypes for car  and boat,  for instance, 
were rich and distinctive, one from the other. Moving to a more concrete, 
subordinate level of categorization, the summary prototypes for sports car  and 
station w a g o n  were still quite rich and vivid, but overlapped considerably in 
characteristic features. Cantor and Mischel [15] found a similar pattern in their 
investigation of summary prototypes in person taxonomies, as did Brewer et al. 
[6] in their study of categories for elderly persons. These results suggest that the 
summary prototype representation is perhaps more useful (in the easy identifica- 
tion of category instances) for categories at a middle (or 'basic'), rather than 
subordinate level of inclusiveness. First of all, retrieving exemplars for categories 
at the more inclusive middle level might become a cumbersome procedure,  since 
the categories are relatively broad. And, in any event, the summary prototypes of 
Social prototypes 15 
middle level categories are reasonably vivid and distinct. Exemplar-prototypes 
would seem to be perfect representations at the subordinate level, however. They 
are as concrete and vivid as possible and they emphas ize  the heterogeneity of 
categories. The exemplar-prototype would appear to be better-suited than the 
summary prototype to 'pull apart '  overlapping categories at the subordinate level 
in these taxonomies. 
Suppose our speculations prove correct, and people show a tendency to retrieve 
exemplars when categorizing at more specific levels, while relying upon the 
summary prototypes at slightly more inclusive levels of categorization. What does 
this suggest with respect to frequency of use of exemplars and summary pro- 
totypes, i.e., frequency of use of categories at subordinate versus middle levels of 
inclusiveness? This remains an open and complex question, of course. However,  it 
does seem likely that the answer will depend upon the expertise of the categorizer 
in that domain, the amount  of information available about the target instance, and 
the goals and purposes of categorizing at all in that context [7, 43]. For example, 
imagine a man enters a cheese shop and requests a pound of cheddar cheese. An 
obsequious salesperson, so inclined, might complicate matters by pressing the 
customer to pinpoint which of many cheddar varieties he desires. 
Is it Vermont,  Wisconsin, goat's, or longhorn cheddar? Does he want it mild, 
medium, or aged? Suppose now the customer merely shrugs 'just plain cheddar' .  
The shrug might imply that the man has not accumulated relevant knowledge or 
exper iences -  the store of easily retrievable, distinctive exempla r s -  that would aid 
in further differentiating the category, cheddar. Alternatively, as Rosch et al. [46] 
note: "I t  is to the organism's advantage not to differentiate one stimulus from 
others when that differentiation is irrelevant to the purposes at hand"  (p. 384). In 
other  words, our immediate purposes often direct how we draw upon our  
knowledge and utilize existing categories. So, if our cheese-shopper were planning 
to bake a casserole imbued with spices pungent enough to overwhelm the flavor 
of cheese anyway, the difference between goat's cheddar and Vermont  cheddar 
would certainly be insignificant. His shrug in such a case would imply indifference 
and not necessarily ignorance. Moreover,  if the same cheese-buyer had entered a 
less specialized cheese shop, one in which all cheddars were considered alike and 
only one kind of cheddar was available that day, then categorizing at the 
subordinate level would be pointless at best. 
Translating to the social domain, the specific subordinate level (represented by 
collections of exemplars) may be more useful for careful and detailed analyses and 
predictions about a specific person's behavior in a given situation. Higher-order,  
more inclusive categories (represented in memory by summary prototypes), on the 
other  hand, may serve better  to organize an overall impression of a group of 
people that can then be distinguished from other  general classes [15, 24]. 
4. The utility o|  representing natural categories by prototypes 
As suggested earlier, prototypes provide us with relatively simple and useful 
cognitive schemes that include much of what we need to know about representa- 
tive members of the spectrum of natural categories. Person prototypes function in 
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much the same way as object  prototypes,  offering the same route to swift and 
efficient processing of information in the social world [30, 31]. The kinds of 
predictions, judgments and inferences that individuals formulate  about members  
of person categories, in contrast to object categories, however,  may have more  
profound effects on the perceiver 's  behavior. 
When it comes to 'things', our  principal question is "What  is i t?" Take  as an 
object of concern, a vehicle. If the vehicle presents itself with two tires, hand- 
lebars, a saddle, gears and handbrakes,  while a motor ,  windshield and steering 
wheel are conspicuously lacking, the object probably jibes well with our  prototype 
of a bicycle. In terms of behavior  one could conceivably choose to ride or, given 
its state of repair, fix the bicycle. And, barring a bizarre past experience, this 
encounter  would be relatively nonaffect-laden. 
Now consider an interaction with an unfamiliar woman who has s topped us on 
the street to obtain directions to such-and-such a street which is, by chance, the 
street we are bound for. The woman brings with her a barrage of informative 
physical a t t r ibu tes -  long straight hair, sandals, no make-up,  a peasant blouse, 
unshaven legs, and a button that reflects an acute dissatisfaction with the current 
political administration. More  abstractly, she seems uninhibited, friendly and 
relaxed. And  she uses a peculiar style of speech flavored with an identifiable 
jargon. Chances are we will not bother  to ask simply, "What  is i t?" Our  
evaluation may be as complex as the person we are interacting with. So, this time 
we might consider " w h a t  kind of person is she? . . . .  Where  is she going? . . . .  Do I 
like her enough to accompany her, since I 'm  headed in the same direction?" 
Interestingly, such questions can be answered quite readily after only a brief 
encounter,  and often with illusory feelings of certainty. Asked to form an 
impression of the woman at this point, we might conclude "She is a hippy-type 
who is probably going to such-and-such a street because there are many food 
coops on that street. Chances are she is in town to attend the anti-nuclear rally. 
He r  political attitudes seem to correspond to ours, and besides, she is probably a 
pacifist, so walking her toward her destination would be safe enough and maybe 
enjoyable ."  
Given time, we might persist in our inference-making and, having categorized 
this woman as a hippy, predict her preferences in entertainment,  music and 
friends. The use of person prototypes serves to create an almost instantaneous 
feeling of 'knowing'  a mere  acquaintance; categories help us to form impressions 
and plans of action and they limit the range of behaviors we can expect f rom a 
given type of person in a specific situation. 
This excerpt f rom an article in the N e w  York  T imes  M a g a z i n e  illustrates the 
kinds of categories and prototypes which people  employ everyday for the pur- 
poses of identification, prediction and decision-making: 
. . .  You can suit your image in the same disgusting way you can do 
anything when money  is no object. I have a friend in the automobile 
business whose name is Fred. He  did it by going on a diet and then buying 
a white Jaguar  for days and a blue Ferrari  for nights. He  had to go on a 
diet because a Ferrari  is a thin car. When you drive a Ferrari, you don ' t  
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have room for an extra pack of king-sized cigarettes, let alone your very 
own spare tire. 
"The  Jag is an open car, that 's  why it's for days",  Fred says. "The  
Ferrari  is a coupe and that 's  why it's for nights. But you talk about  this 
image t h i n g - y o u  can pret ty  much typecast who will own what kind of car. 
If you ' re  a pilot, for instance, you buy a Saab. Guys who are into 
mechanical weirdness always buy Saabs . . . .  " 
(New York Times, Sunday, July 10, 1983). 
Sometimes,  of course, such inferences, based on superficial appearances  or brief 
contact, are inaccurate and even hurtful. Research on stereotyping has demon-  
strated the pernicious effects of overgeneralizing f rom exemplars and prototypes  
in a way that homogenizes perceptions of all target instances [22]. Individuals all 
too easily relieve the burden of discriminating atypical f rom typical category 
members  by "filling in missing features"  with prototypic o n e s -  "all Germans  are 
industrious, dogmatic,  and nationalistic, aren ' t  they?"  [18, 22]. While prototypes 
may be very useful in this regard, the use of prototypes,  ironically, may encourage 
perceivers to overlook the actual heterogeneity within natural categories, as well 
as the overlap between categories [40]. So, we say "children will be children" or 
" those two are as different as night and day".  Prototypes do help organize social 
stimuli and smooth over  the complexities of the social world, though perhaps  a bit 
too well. 
Despite  these hazards involved in the over-use of person prototypes,  we feel 
that these constructs can be of substantial value in everyday life. Person pro-  
totypes do facilitate social interaction by helping us form impressions of other  
people  quickly and then to plan our  interpersonal behavior,  accordingly. The 
impressions are sometimes inaccurate, as in the case of fallacious stereotyping. 
Yet, particularly when one has been careless, it is still possible to acknowledge 
one 's  errors during the course of a social interaction and correct them (i.e., 
substitute another,  more  appropr ia te  prototype).  In order  to initiate behavior  
people  need to reduce the cognitive strain f rom the abundance of incoming social 
stimuli; person prototypes are quite useful generalizations in that respect. 
Such prototypes might also serve another  useful function in naturalistic settings. 
That  is, prototypes supply the information and focus we need to entertain 
everyday decision-making tasks. Suppose, for example,  that you were agonizing 
over  the attractive option of buying a Saab or a Ferrari. Now, having just 
' learned '  about  the prototype for 'Saab-people '  and 'Ferrar i -people ' ,  you would 
be in a position to compare  yourself to each person prototype and make  a choice 
of the car which best fits your personality. Of course, our  choices of products, 
vacations, houses, friends, and so on are determined by many factors other than 
personality suitability. Still, personality suitability is one pert inent  factor in many 
decisions, and prototype-matching is, thus, an extremely functional heuristic. For 
that reason, among others, we suggest that person prototypes are knowledge 
structures of high utility in everyday life. In order  to make  this point more  
convincingly, we will turn now to a case study of the usefulness of person 
prototypes in a naturalistic decision task. 
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5. Case study 
In the present study, we [36] undertook an analysis of a social decision-making 
task in which we believed the utility of person prototypes could be powerfully 
demonstrated. The decision concerned selection of housing on the part of 
one-hundred and sixteen college freshmen at the University of Wisconsin. The 
University environment offers students a variety of living possibilities; seven 
major housing categories were identified: coed dormitory, single sex dormitory, 
fraternity and sorority, cooperative, apartment,  rented house (fiat with other  
students), or a rented room in a private residence. We were able to interview the 
students about factors underlying their decisions as they were in the process of 
deliberating between these options in the spring of their freshman year. 
Our analysis of the role of person prototypes in decision-making (about 
housing) stemmed from the following observation: Person prototypes sometimes 
contain information about the settings that different kinds of individuals tend to 
occupy or enter [10]. For example, expectations about interactions with waitres- 
ses, professors or dentists derive in part from knowledge about the typical events, 
roles and behavioral demands characteristic of the (prototypic) situations in which 
these people are encountered [1, 20]. Individuals often feel confident to pre- 
dict who will be comfortable and successful in many contexts [13, 15, 52]. In so 
doing, they make use of prototypes of suitable person-in-situation combinations 
[4, 10]. 
On the basis of prior work on person-in-situation prototypes (e.g., [16], we 
reasoned that college students would share quite consensual impressions of the 
person-best-suited for the different housing situations. Moreover,  we assumed 
that some students would be able to make use of those prototypes in order  to 
rank order  the desirability of living in each housing option, i.e., preferring the 
situation whose prototype best fit their own self-images [25, 32]. Our primary aim 
was to determine whether students used their knowledge of person prototypes to 
decide where they themselves would be most happy and comfortable and, if so, 
who could best make use of a self-to-prototype matching heuristic in this decision 
task. We attempted to outline a "prototype '  of the individual who possesses and 
can utilize social knowledge in order  to discriminate 'good' from 'poor '  self-in- 
situation matches. 
Our first task was to see if these students actually had person-in-situation 
prototypes in this domain. For this purpose, we analyzed the richness and 
distinctiveness of a consensual person-in-housing prototype for each of the seven 
housing options. Next, we compared the individual's own housing prototypes to 
their self-concept descriptions, in order  to assess the utility of a self-to-prototype 
matching rule in housing selection. Students were asked, as part of the interview, 
to rank order  the seven housing options in terms of their preferences for 
university housing. The correspondence between an individual's self-to-prototype 
match and their preference rank order  for each housing option provided the test 
of the matching rule. Ultimately, we looked at subsamples of students for whom a 
self-to-prototype matching rule was especially predictive of their housing prefer-  
ences. 
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5.1. Consensual  person-in-housing prototypes 
Consensual person-in-housing prototypes were of interest for two reasons: 
First, it was important  for us to document  that these students did, in fact, share 
rich, distinctive, and intuitively reasonable prototypes in this domain. Also, we 
wished to demonst ra te  that even these consensual prototypes,  relatively global 
indicators of knowledge about  housing, would have some bearing on the students '  
housing preferences.  
The  method employed to tap consensual person-in-housing prototypes was 
based on li terature showing that individuals frequently describe the person who is 
best-suited for a situation in terms of characteristic personality traits [16]. To  
elicit the prototypes  we gave all subjects a list of 100 trait adjectives covering a 
wide spectrum of personality domains [28]. They were asked to consider the 
housing situations separately, and for each one, to rate how accurately each 
adjective described the 'typical person who would be happy and comfortable  
living in this housing situation'.  Subjects characterized their own prototype of the 
best-suited person by rating each of the 100 adjectives on a scale f rom one (not at 
all true) to eight (very true). 1 Consensual prototypes were constructed by selecting 
the traits that were described as very true (ratings of 7 or 8) and those traits that 
were considered not at all true (ratings of 1 or 2) by at least 50% of the 116 
subjects. Lists of the specific adjectives descriptive (i.e., definitely true and 
definitely not true) of each prototype are presented in Table 1. 
Two aspects of these consensual prototypes are noteworthy here. First, the 
prototypes  were indeed rich (on average, 14.7 traits rated as very true and 7.6 
traits rated as not at all true for each prototype).  However ,  the richness was not 
reflective of a bias to describe each prototype with the same traits; the prototypes  
were also distinctive. Table 2 presents the percentage of each proto type ' s  descrip- 
tive traits shared by each of the other  six prototypes.  These figures clearly indicate 
that each prototype had both shared and unique features within the set of options. 
The  prototypes also over lapped predictably and to different degrees: For exam- 
ple, the prototype of the person most  comfortable  in a single sex dormitory shared 
69% of its descriptive features in common with the person best-suited for a coed 
dormitory, while the fraternity type over lapped in only 4% of its traits with the 
prototype for room in a private residence. This pat tern of prototype richness and 
inter-prototype distinctiveness supported our assertion that prototypes can be 
useful in decision processes. 
Encouraged by the integrity of these consensual prototypes,  we first looked at 
the correspondence between the most frequently preferred housing options and 
the consensual prototypes  which provided the best matches to the students '  self 
descriptions. (Each student had rated him/herself on the same 100 traits used to 
construct the consensual prototypes.)  For each housing option, we obtained a 
measure  of average overlap between the students '  self-concepts and the attributes 
1 We chose a structured, rather than a free-description procedure for prototype construction, so that 
the same 100 adjectives could be used in the self-description task. In this way, self-to-prototype match 









































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 2. Inter-prototype similarity 
21 
Comparison prototypes 
Room in Rented 
Target Single sex Fraternity/ private Coed house 
prototypes a dormitory Apartment  Coop Sorority residence dormitory or fiat 
Single sex 
dormitory - -  39% 77% 46% 23% 69% 85% 
Apartment  42% - -  67% 33% 50% 33% 67% 
Coop 42% 29% - -  38% 17% 58% 83% 
Fraternity/ 
Sorority 23% 15% 35% - -  4% 65% 50% 
Room in 
private 
residence 12% 23% 15% 4% - -  0% 23% 
Coed 
dormitory 33% 15% 52% 63% 0% - -  70% 
Rented 
house 
or flat 39% 29% 71% 46% 21% 68% - -  
aThese numbers represent the percentage of descriptive traits in the target prototype which are also 
shared by the comparison prototype. 
descriptive of the consensual prototype.  These average measures of self-to- 
consensual-prototype overlap were quite well-reflected in the students '  actual 
housing preferences.  For example,  58% of the students listed apartment  as a first 
or second choice; apar tment  was also the option with the closest self-to- 
consensual-prototype match, on average. Similarly, only 14% of the students 
listed room in a private residence as a first or second choice; and room was the 
option with the least self- to-consensual-prototype overlap. Thus, the average self 
match to the consensual prototypes was reflected in the students '  preferences.  
5.2. Indiv idual  prototypes and preferences 
So far, we have described students '  preferences as a group and have looked at 
their consensual knowledge of the housing options. We reasoned, however,  that 
predictions about  the preferences of particular students would most likely best be 
made on the basis of each individual's prototypes  for the seven housing options. 
That  is, despite the general agreement  among the students on the characteristics 
of the prototypes,  individuals certainly differed in some of the specifics of their 
impressions of the best-suited person for each housing option. So, individual 
prototypes  containing the traits rated as very true (7, 8) and very untrue (1, 2) by 
each person for each housing option were constructed (average richness = 22.1 
very true traits and 13.9 very untrue traits). These  individual prototypes were used 
in all further analyses. 
The decision rule with which we were most  concerned was a self- to-prototype 
matching rule. We wondered,  that is, whether  the individual s tudent 's  preference 
for any particular housing option would be related to the closeness of her 
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self-concept to her prototype for that housing situation. In order  to test this 
hypothesis, we needed a measure of the individual's self-concept which could be 
compared with his prototype for each housing option. Therefore,  we asked 
students to describe themselves with respect to the same 100 trait adjectives used 
to construct the person-in-housing prototypes. 
Each student's self-concept check list was then matched against each person-in- 
situation prototype in order to find the similarity of the self-to-prototype across 
the seven options. Specifically, for each option, we subtracted the rating of every 
adjective on the self-concept check list from the rating of the same adjective in 
that individual's prototype.  We then found the absolute values of the differences 
and averaged them across the 100 traits to obtain a single 'similarity' score (e.g., 
the smaller the score, the more similar the self to the prototype) for each self to 
prototype combination. 
Once more we compared the self-prototype comparisons to the housing prefer- 
ence rankings, and once more a telling pattern emerged. A rank order correlation 
was obtained for each subject for their match of self to prototype similarity and 
preference of housing option. This rank order  correlation was our operational 
measure of the self-to-prototype matching rule in everyday decision-making. The 
utility of this rule, and, therefore, the importance of person prototypes in this 
domain, was reflected in the magnitude of that correlation. In fact, on average, 
these students' preferences followed the order  of their self-to-prototype similarity 
scores, significantly (rco~ = 0.37, p < 0.001). Therefore,  across the whole sample of 
116 students, the self-to-prototype matching rule was a reasonable, though 
certainly not perfect predictor of preferences of the seven housing options. As we 
suspected, housing prototypes were useful in this decision task. 
Of course, the decision about university housing concerns factors other than 
finding a situation in which one would be comfortable as a person. Since, on 
average, the matching rule rank order correlation was imperfect we suspected that 
other factors, besides degree of self-to-prototype match, were operating in this 
decision task (e.g, economic constraints, bad experiences with a particular option, 
word-of-mouth commentary,  and so on). We hypothesized that some students 
at tended more concertedly than did others (perhaps quite automatically and 
without awareness) to maximizing the fit between their personality attributes, 
skills and liabilities and those 'required' by the housing situation (i.e., in the 
housing prototype). The next task, therefore, was to identify this subsample of 
students, whom we will label the 'maximal rule users'. 
5.3. M a x i m a l  use of  prototypes 
Who would be inclined to use the rule most? As part of their interview, the 
students had been asked to list for us the most important factor(s) or piece(s) of 
information influencing their considerations about housing. Half of the subjects 
listed economic factors as the most important determinant of their decision (e.g., 
price of rent and utilities, transportation possibilities). The other half mentioned 
compatibility with their housemates or neighbors as their main consideration. If 
an individual is restricted by economic considerations in the housing selection it is 
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doubtful that he will consult his store of intuitive social concepts to address the 
decision task. We reasoned that students whose objectives dealt with social- 
interpersonal aspects of housing would draw on their person-in-situation pro- 
totypes in making a housing decision. We expected, moreover,  that among the 
sample of students with interpersonal goals differences would exist in the extent to 
which these prototypes would be implicated in a self-to-prototypes matching 
strategy. Therefore,  tests of the interactions between goals and individual differ- 
ences in two dimensions of social knowledge were performed. 
First, we divided these students ( N = 5 8 )  according to their scores on the 
Snyder Self-Monitoring Scale [50]. This is a 25 item trait scale which our students 
had filled out at the end of the interview. Individuals who obtain high scores on 
this scale (e.g., high self-monitors) are very interested in and attuned to the 
requirements of different social situations (see [52]). High self-monitors seem to 
strive quite consistently to 'be the right person in the right situation' and have the 
skills to do so [51]. Low self-monitors are more conscious of being 'themselves' 
across situations and less apt to change their behavior to match situational 
demands. We expected, therefore,  that low self-monitors would be more con- 
cerned with self-situation matches than the more flexible high self-monitors. 
This was, in fact, the case. Low self-monitors who had interpersonal goals 
( N =  18) preferred housing whose prototype they matched (average rco~ = 0.54) 
far more often than did the high (N = 17) self-monitors with interpersonal goals 
(average r . . . .  = 0.20, p = 0.03). A similar difference between high and low self- 
monitors, in use of the self-to-prototype matching rule, was not observed in the 
subsample of students with practical goals. In our second analysis of the utility of 
the self-to-prototype matching rule, we looked at the students with interpersonal 
goals who also had rated many traits as no t  a t  al l  true of themselves (a prototype 
of self knowledge we call 'high distinctiveness'). We hypothesized that if an 
individual has interpersonal goals and yet knows that many traits are very u n t r u e  
of himself, that individual will be particularly anxious to find a 'good' housing 
match. The individual who 'knows' that many traits are clearly u n t r u e  of himself 
may also "know"  that he will have to work harder  to fulfill those interpersonal 
goals, i.e.,-to find a 'good' self-housing fit. To test this hypothesis, we divided 
students into subgroups: students who had rated many traits as no t  a t  al l  true of 
themselves, relative to the total sample of students (High Distinctiveness); and 
students with interpersonal goals who had rated relatively few traits as no t  a t  al l  
true of themselves (Low Distinctiveness). Again, our  suspicions proved correct. 
Students with low distinctiveness scores and interpersonal goals (N = 28) used a 
self-to-prototype matching rule less often (average rco~=0.28) than did the 
students with the high distinctiveness (N = 30) scores (average rco= = 0.52). This 
difference in the degree to which these students' preferences matched their self- 
to-prototype similarity scores was statistically significant (p = 0.05). Again, this 
difference did not obtain for students with practical goals. 
The foregoing analyses suggest that not only can person prototypes be useful to 
everyone in such a decision task, but they can be especially useful to "some of the 
people, some of the t ime" [3]. It seems that ' in analyzing the utility of prototypes 
in naturalistic decision making, it is crucial to pay attention to the goals of the 
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individuals who are engaged in the decision task. The importance of individuals' 
goals in shaping social cognition has only recently begun to receive the attention 
which it deserves [21, 23]. 
In the present study, we were concerned with individuals' social knowledge and 
skills in a naturalistic decision task. The domain of interest, university housing 
choices, was actually quite a complex one: We focused upon one set of 
knowledge-  prototypes of suitable p e r s o n -  housing f i t -  and one decision r u l e -  
self-to-prototype matching. The comparisons between average self-prototype 
match across the sample and overall preferences made it clear that person 
prototypes could be important in this task. On an individual level, our actual test 
of use of the prototype matching rule was a quite rigorous one. In order  to obtain 
a substantial rank order  correlation between self-to-prototype similarity and 
housing preferences, a student had to demonstrate articulate knowledge of the 
self in relation to all seven prototypes and then use that knowledge to rank his 
preferences by goodness-of-self-fit in all seven situations. The rank order  correla- 
tion, our test of the rule, would have been reduced considerably if an individual 
eliminated even a few of the options out-of-hand, on the basis of factors other 
than self-prototype m a t c h - f o r  example, word-of-mouth reputation, financial 
constraints, and so forth. Therefore,  in acknowledging the difficulty of using a 
self-to-prototype matching rule by these standards, we were encouraged by the 
significant patterns (of rank order correlations) that did emerge from these data. 
6. Conclusions 
Why do we categorize objects and persons at all, if we can only partition them 
into fuzzy sets nested within loosely structured taxonomies? Doesn ' t  categoriza- 
tion do more harm than good, create more 'mess' than order, especially in the 
person domain? The present review has developed our  contention that, contrary 
to intuition, 'fuzziness' does not  imply 'messiness' or 'uselessness'. Even in the 
person domain, an area in which experts have struggled to construct formal 
taxonomies, the orderliness and utility of fuzzy natural categories can be 
documented.  
We introduced our argument for the theoretical utility of natural categories 
with the notion of a category prototype.  That is, though they lack defining 
features and clear-cut boundaries, natural categories can be unified and organized 
around the representative or prototypic category exemplars. Some category 
exemplars better  epitomize the essential meaning of the concept than others; 
these prototypes can serve as reference points in the identification of 'new' 
category members. A continuum of prototypicality of membership, as well as 
consensual rules for judging goodness-of-fit in the category, have been 
documented for natural categories ranging from birds to extroverts to parties. 
Thinking about prototypes brings order to the structure of fuzzy categories. 
If the structure of natural categories can be simplified or clarified by focusing on 
prototypic exemplars, so, too, can the mental representations for the categories. 
The central meaning, as well as the heterogeneity of membership in a category 
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can be nicely captured in a prototype representation.  The  pro to type  may take the 
form of a collection of 'classic' category exemplars or it may be a summary  or 
abstraction of the characteristic features of category members .  Regardless of the 
exact form, and both representat ions may exist, the prototype helps summarize 
the central tendency and the variability in the features of category members .  In so 
doing, the pro to type  reduces an enormous  quantity of information into a rather  
neat capsule summary;  that representat ion can then help the perceiver to identify 
'new'  category m e m b e r s - t o  answer the question, "what  is tha t?"  And, in the 
domain of persons, the prototype also provides information about  the likely 
behavior  of this 'o ther  person ' ,  so as to facilitate quick responses and ease social 
interaction. How else would you 'know'  in advance the possible outcomes of an 
encounter  with a hippy? 
Finally, if the structure is orderly and the mental  representat ion is rich yet 
economical,  then why not use natural categories in everyday life? Well, we do, or 
so it seems. Natural  categories are useful not only in making identifications and 
predictions about potential  category members ,  but also in making personal 
decisions about  products to buy, people  with whom to affiliate, and houses in 
which to live. By using the information in prototypes,  individuals can test the 
match of a person, place or object  to their own tastes quite easily. This was 
supported by the case analysis of students '  preferences for university housing. In 
that analysis, the match between students '  own characteristics and those of the 
person whom they imagined best-fit each particular housing option (a person-in- 
housing prototype)  was significantly related to preference in housing. Naturalistic 
decision-making can be eased through the use of a self- to-prototype matching 
rule, in order  to differentiate between 'good '  and 'poor '  options. People even 
share such prototypes for car o w n e r s - a r e  you the typical 'Toyota  type' ,  ' B M W  
type '  or 'Ford type '?  It is quite useful in the business of living to know your 
person prototypes.  
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